

Americas

12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings and adopted three resolutions on the question concerning Haiti. Five meetings took the form of briefings and three meetings were convened for the adoption of a resolution.⁴⁴⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.⁴⁴⁵

In 2023, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Heads of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) briefed the Council four times further to the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the mission.⁴⁴⁶ The Council was also briefed by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Executive Director of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the President of the Haitian High Council of Transition and a representative of *Fondasyon Je Klere* (FJKL), a civil society organization.⁴⁴⁷ The Council also heard two briefings by the representative of Gabon in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#).⁴⁴⁸ In addition to Haiti, which was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship on three occasions, the meetings under this item featured the participation and statements from the representatives of Barbados and Canada (speaking on behalf of the Economic and Social Council Advisory Group on Haiti), the Dominican Republic (represented three times by its Minister for Foreign Affairs), Guyana, Jamaica (speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and represented once by its Prime Minister) and Kenya.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁴⁴⁵ Council members held informal consultations on 24 January, 26 April, 6 July and 12 December 2023. See [A/78/2](#), part II, chap. 7.

⁴⁴⁶ See [S/PV.9247](#), [S/PV.9311](#), [S/PV.9368](#), and [S/PV.9449](#).

⁴⁴⁷ See [S/PV.9311](#), [S/PV.9368](#), and [S/PV.9449](#).

⁴⁴⁸ See [S/PV.9368](#), [S/PV.9504](#), and [S/PV.9504/Corr.1](#).

⁴⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9247](#), [S/PV.9311](#), [S/PV.9368](#), [S/PV.9377](#), [S/PV.9430](#), [S/PV.9444](#), and [S/PV.9449](#).

In their statements to the Council, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Haiti reported on the security, political, economic and humanitarian crises in the country and efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti, with the support of the United Nations and regional actors, to address the root causes of the crisis.⁴⁵⁰ On 24 January, in the first meeting of the year under this item and in her last briefing as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, Ms. Helen La Lime reported that gang-related violence in Haiti had reached levels not seen in decades.⁴⁵¹ She informed that the violence was part of well-defined strategies designed to subjugate populations and expand territorial control and that gangs had intentionally blocked access to food, water and, amid a cholera outbreak, health services. Approximately five million people were facing conditions of acute hunger across the country. Moreover, she expressed the view that the unanimous adoption of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) by the Council, establishing sanctions measures, and the signing by Haitian stakeholders of the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections on 21 December 2022 by a broad spectrum of stakeholders were two key developments that could meaningfully contribute to overcoming the crisis. In that regard, she noted that the Consensus identified a calendar for installing an elected Government by February 2024, listed immediate steps to be taken for the promotion of fiscal reforms to increase State revenue collection and to restore public services, and established a High Transitional Council. The Special Representative concluded by noting the importance of the deployment of an international specialized force, as requested by the Government of Haiti in October 2022 and that, without such assistance, the positive developments related to the political process and the sanctions would remain fragile and vulnerable to being reversed.

On 26 April, Ms. María Isabel Salvador, the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, reported that gang criminality had grown and continued to expand in and outside the capital, including sexual violence against women and girls.⁴⁵² Children were among the victims of the most heinous crimes and many schools had been closed as of late 2022 as a result of violence and extortion by gangs. She stressed that, despite continued

⁴⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9247](#), [S/PV.9311](#), [S/PV.9368](#), and [S/PV.9449](#).

⁴⁵¹ See [S/PV.9247](#).

⁴⁵² See [S/PV.9311](#).

Government investment, the Haitian National Police was severely understaffed and ill-equipped to address the violence and criminality. The Special Representative noted the efforts towards the implementation of the agreement of 21 December 2022, including with the Court of Cassation being rendered functional on 28 February 2023, and standing ready to swear in a new provisional electoral council once established.

In her statement at the meeting, the Executive Director of UNODC stressed that the lack of law enforcement, escalation of violence and scale of organized criminal activities had progressively contributed to the deepening of the crisis in Haiti. She noted new dynamics of groups acting outside of Port-au-Prince directly involved in the trafficking of increasingly sophisticated weapons into Haiti by land, air and sea. She informed that severe limitations in maritime control capacities and lack of border surveillance had curtailed efforts to stop this influx, enabling gang-related violence to reach unprecedented levels and that the threat of illegal drug trafficking was growing. The Executive Director noted that UNODC had been fast-tracking its assistance on border management and continued to closely collaborate with BINUH. She concluded by underscoring the importance of financial support commensurate with the challenges to help Haiti build strong security and justice institutions and address the root causes of instability.

On 6 July, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti reported that the High Transitional Council organized a forum in May 2023 that had brought together representatives from the political, civil society and private sector, including non-signatories to the agreement, providing an opportunity for all Haitian stakeholders to discuss key issues concerning constitutional and electoral reforms, good governance and socioeconomic issues.⁴⁵³ She also noted the joint declaration adopted at the forum, calling for the deployment of international support to the Haitian National Police, with full respect for Haiti's national sovereignty.

In his statement on behalf of its 14 member States, the Prime Minister of Jamaica informed that CARICOM had established a three-member eminent persons group, comprising the former Prime Ministers of the Bahamas, Jamaica and Saint Lucia to work with Haitian

⁴⁵³ See [S/PV.9368](#).

national stakeholders, civil society and all partners to contribute to the achievement of an inclusive, intra-Haitian dialogue. He further noted that CARICOM had called on the Government of Haiti to honour its commitments regarding interim governance and transition made at the three-day engagement with Haitian stakeholders in Kingston in June 2023. While describing the imposition of sanctions on gang members as a good and important step, the Prime Minister underscored the urgency of pursuing multinational security efforts and called for a Council resolution to that effect as soon as possible.

In his briefing, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) reported on his visit to Haiti and the Dominican Republic from 12 to 16 June, the main purpose of which was to obtain first-hand accounts of the situation following the imposition of United Nations sanctions. The Chair noted wide support for the implementation of the sanctions regime, along with the hope from some that more individuals would be designated by the Committee and calls for an integrated management of the crisis, including an inclusive political process, restoration of democratic institutions, institution-building and reform of the justice and security sectors.

The representative of *Fondasyon Je Klere* (FJKL), a Haitian human rights organization which runs a nationwide human rights training programme, noted that Haiti was facing systematic human rights violations and that fundamental freedoms were greatly threatened by the proliferation of gangs. She stated that, for the past two years, the Haitian population had been unable to peacefully move from one town to another, mainly due to the rising number of kidnappings, especially impacting girls and women. She reported that State authorities were failing in their duty to protect, respect and ensure respect for human rights, leading to crimes perpetrated every day with total impunity. Finally, she proposed to the Council several recommendations to address the worrisome situation in Haiti.

On 14 July, by resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH as set out in resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for one year, until 15 July 2024, with some adjustments.⁴⁵⁴ The Council further increased the number of civilian and seconded personnel serving as police and corrections advisors in the mission from 42 to 70, and decided to scale up

⁴⁵⁴ Resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see part X, sect. II.

its strategic and advisory support to the training and investigation capacities of the Haitian National Police.⁴⁵⁵ With respect to the situation in Haiti, the Council requested all Haitian stakeholders to urgently reach an agreement on a sustainable, time-bound and commonly accepted roadmap for elections.⁴⁵⁶ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report to the Council outlining the support options that the United Nations could provide to enhance the security situation, including the support for a non-United Nations multinational force, or a possible peacekeeping operation, in the context of supporting a political settlement in Haiti.⁴⁵⁷

On 2 October, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), authorizing the formation and deployment by Member States of a Multinational Security Support mission with a lead country, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, for an initial period of twelve months, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections.⁴⁵⁸ The Multinational Security Support mission was mandated to provide operational support to the Haitian National Police, including building its capacity through the planning and conduct of joint security support operations to counter gangs and improve security conditions, as well as support for the provision of security for critical infrastructure sites.⁴⁵⁹ The Council also called on the mission to help ensure unhindered and safe access to humanitarian aid for the population receiving assistance and authorized the participating Member States to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate, strictly adhering to all international law, including international human rights law.⁴⁶⁰

Furthermore, while welcoming the announcement of 29 July by the Government of Kenya to positively consider leading a multinational mission at the invitation of Haiti, as well as the positive responses to participate made by several Member States, the Council called on Member States and regional organizations to contribute personnel, equipment, and necessary

⁴⁵⁵ Resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), para. 2. See also resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#).

⁴⁵⁶ Resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#), para. 4.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 18.

⁴⁵⁸ Resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 1(a) and (b).

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., paras. 2 and 5.

financial and logistic resources based upon the urgent needs of the mission.⁴⁶¹ The Council requested Member States participating in the mission to ensure the highest standards of transparency, conduct and discipline for their contingents, to establish a robust compliance mechanism to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations or abuses of human rights.⁴⁶² The Council also requested the leadership of the mission to develop the rules of engagement and directives on the use of force in consultation with Haiti, and to report every three months once it was operational on the ground.⁴⁶³ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, no later than nine months following the adoption of the resolution, recommendations on possible adaptation of the mandate of the mission or its transformation as needed and requested the leadership of the mission to develop a strategy for mission conclusion and withdrawal.⁴⁶⁴ Finally, by resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), the Council broadened the scope of the arms embargo imposed in resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) by deciding that Member States should take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Haiti of small arms, light weapons and ammunition, no longer limiting the measure to individuals and entities designated by the sanctions Committee.⁴⁶⁵

Resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions from China and the Russian Federation.⁴⁶⁶ Speaking after the vote, most Council members welcomed the establishment of the Multinational Security Support mission and expressed gratitude to Kenya for offering to lead it. Some speakers underlined that the deployment of a security support mission would not on its own resolve the crisis in Haiti and reiterated the need for a comprehensive and sustainable political solution.⁴⁶⁷ The representative of China recalled that his country had always taken a cautious and responsible approach to the invocation of Chapter VII in authorizing the use of force by the Council and that there had been precedents of the abuse of that authorization in previous practice. Nevertheless, he stated that in view of the security situation in Haiti, China had taken a constructive position on the adoption resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#)

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., twentieth preambular paragraph and para. 4.

⁴⁶² Ibid., para. 10.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., paras. 9 and 18.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., paras. 19 and 20.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 14.

⁴⁶⁶ See [S/PV.9430](#).

⁴⁶⁷ China, Malta, Japan, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Brazil, and Guyana.

and stressed that its implementation had to comply with international law and avoid infringing on the sovereignty of other countries or interfering in their internal affairs. While also acknowledging the urgency of the security problems that Haiti was facing, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that sending armed forces of another State to any country, even at that country's request, was an extreme measure that had to be thoroughly thought through. The representative of the Russian Federation further noted that his delegation's requests for more detailed information about the mission's concept of operations, the modalities for the use of force and withdrawal strategy had gone unanswered and that, as a permanent member of the Council, the Russian Federation could not agree to a "blind invocation" of Chapter VII. While recalling that Haiti had historically experienced irresponsible foreign interference, the representative expressed hope that the mission would help stabilize the situation, while respecting the country's sovereignty and the rights of its people.⁴⁶⁸ In his statement, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of Haiti described the adoption of resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) as a significant step towards resolving Haiti's multidimensional crisis.⁴⁶⁹ He noted that the resolution clearly stated that the rules of engagement and the use of force, which he also described as essential to create a security environment conducive to the formal functioning of institutions, had to be carried out in consultation with Haiti and the other participating States and in strict compliance with Haitian sovereignty and international law.

On 19 October, by resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously renewed the travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo measures concerning Haiti for a period of one year, until 19 October 2024.⁴⁷⁰ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months, until 19 November 2024, and directed the Committee to consider expeditiously updating the list of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#).⁴⁷¹ The Council expressed its intention to support the further development of fair and clear procedures for individuals and entities designated

⁴⁶⁸ For more information on the discussion in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.]

⁴⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9430](#).

⁴⁷⁰ See [S/PV.9444](#), and resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), para. 3. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Haiti, see part VII, sect. III.

⁴⁷¹ Resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), paras. 4 and 19. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. B.

pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), including through the Focal Point for Delisting established by resolution [1730 \(2006\)](#).⁴⁷² In addition, the Council called upon the Multinational Security Support mission, authorized by resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), to implement weapons and ammunition management processes and oversight mechanisms and to report any diversion of weapons and ammunition to the Panel of Experts, and to cooperate with Government of Haitian's efforts to reinforce their management.⁴⁷³ Finally, the Council directed the Panel of Experts to cooperate with BINUH, UNODC, CARICOM and relevant expert groups to provide support to the work of the sanctions Committees, and urged Member States and the Multinational Security Support mission to ensure cooperation with the Panel.⁴⁷⁴

At the meeting held on 23 October, the Special Representative to the Secretary-General commended the Eminent Persons Group of CARICOM for its support in promoting a Haitian-led and -owned dialogue, but pointed out that significant differences persisted among stakeholders, hindering a clear path to elections.⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, while underlining the enormous significance of the adoption of resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#), she highlighted the need to ensure the mission's compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and its zero-tolerance policy with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as to ensure the proper vetting and training of personnel. The Special Representative added that re-establishing the control of the Haitian National Police was a prerequisite for holding credible and inclusive elections, and that addressing issues such as sexual violence and child protection was imperative to ensure sociopolitical cohesion and lasting peace. Finally, the Special Representative called for close coordination between the Multinational Security Support mission, BINUH and the United Nations Country Team.

The Executive Director of UNICEF, also speaking as the designated Principal Advocate on Haiti for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for the humanitarian situation in that country, informed that the crisis in Haiti was growing complicated every day, with half of the population in need of humanitarian assistance but unable to get it due to insecurity and insufficient funding. She stated that basic services were on the verge of collapse and that armed groups had strangled

⁴⁷² Resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), para. 5.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., paras. 14 and 15.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., paras. 21 and 22.

⁴⁷⁵ See [S/PV.9449](#).

major transport routes from Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country, destroying livelihoods, restricting access to essential services and intensifying nutrition crisis, especially for children. In reference to the cholera outbreak, the Executive Director pointed out that the national health system did not have the capacity to adequately respond to the health and nutrition needs of vulnerable population. Finally, she stressed that the Multinational Security Support mission had to prioritize the protection of civilians in all its operations and ensure that children who were associated with armed groups were regarded as victims of violations of international law.

In her remarks, the Executive Director of UNODC stressed that, to re-establish normalcy, it was imperative to halt the flow of illicit firearms into Haiti and to establish a robust regulatory framework for such weapons. She noted the identification of four major sea and land routes for the illicit flows of firearms and ammunition, coming primarily from the United States. She stated that through the routes, traffickers were taking advantage of the Haitian security sector's limited capacities for border and maritime control and surveillance, and that Haiti's police were operating in a continued state of emergency. She further explained that the demand for firearms was linked to the need of the criminal groups to enforce the illicit drug trade, as Haiti remained a transit destination, primarily for cocaine and cannabis. To control weapons and seize drugs, she underlined that it would be essential to enforce tighter controls at borders in Haiti and abroad, and to pair it with improved financial transparency and accountability measures.

In his briefing on 12 December, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) noted the slow implementation of resolution [2699 \(2023\)](#) and underscored the vital need for the effective deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission.⁴⁷⁶ He further noted that the Committee was working to expand the sanctions and had made significant progress in that regard.

In their statements at the meetings held in 2023, Council members and other participating Member States expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Haiti, with many of them underlining the need for perpetrators of violence and human rights violations to be brought to justice. They also expressed concern regarding the illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition into Haiti and called for the full implementation of the sanctions

⁴⁷⁶ See [S/PV.9504](#) and [S/PV.9504/Corr.1](#).

measures imposed by the Council under resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#). Moreover, several speakers underscored the need for the Council to expand the list of persons designated under the sanctions regime.⁴⁷⁷ Council members and other speakers also highlighted the interlinkages between the insecurity and political challenges in the country and expressed broad support for Haitian-led dialogue and efforts to facilitate the political conditions to hold free and fair elections.⁴⁷⁸ Several speakers welcomed the 21 December 2022 Consensus, as a step forwards for Haitians to get back to restoring their country's stability.⁴⁷⁹ Most Council members and other Member States expressed support for the deployment of an international security assistance mission to restore order and the rule of law in the country, and create an environment conducive to the holding of future elections.⁴⁸⁰ Nevertheless, some speakers recalled the need to learn from the past outside interventions in Haiti and to work with Haitian stakeholders to achieve long-term stability in the country.⁴⁸¹ Concerning the humanitarian and socioeconomic situation, several Council members and other speakers noted that the country was unable to address the cholera outbreak, which was disproportionately impacting children and young people.⁴⁸² Participants also referred to the severe food insecurity and water scarcity crisis, as well as the continued grave violations of

⁴⁷⁷ See [S/PV.9247](#), China, Albania and United Kingdom; [S/PV.9311](#), China, France, Malta, Japan, United Kingdom and Haiti; [S/PV.9368](#), United States, United Arab Emirates, France, Albania, Malta, Japan, China; [S/PV.9449](#), United Arab Emirates, France, Malta, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and China; and [S/PV.9444](#), Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), and Haiti.

⁴⁷⁸ See [S/PV.9247](#), United States, China, Brazil, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Malta, United Kingdom, Japan and Haiti; [S/PV.9311](#), Brazil, Malta and Haiti; [S/PV.9368](#), United Arab Emirates, Japan and China; and [S/PV.9377](#), China, and Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique).

⁴⁷⁹ See [S/PV.9247](#), United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Malta, Ecuador, France, Russian Federation, Japan and Haiti; [S/PV.9311](#), United States, Ecuador, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), Albania, France, Brazil, Japan, United Kingdom and Haiti; [S/PV.9368](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), United Arab Emirates, France, Albania, Japan and Barbados (on behalf of the Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti); and [S/PV.9449](#), Japan.

⁴⁸⁰ [S/PV.9247](#), Brazil, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, United Kingdom, Malta, France, Japan and Haiti; [S/PV.9311](#), Ecuador, Albania and Haiti; [S/PV.9368](#), France, Albania, Malta, Japan, United Kingdom and Haiti; and [S/PV.9377](#), United States, United Kingdom and Haiti.

⁴⁸¹ See [S/PV.9247](#), China, Dominican Republic, Canada; [S/PV.9368](#), Russian Federation; [S/PV.9377](#), China; and [S/PV.9449](#), Russian Federation.

⁴⁸² See [S/PV.9247](#), United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Malta, Switzerland, Russian Federation and Japan; [S/PV.9311](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), China and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV.9368](#), China.

human rights.⁴⁸³ Council members and other speakers further stressed the gravity of increased poverty and the economic downturn, as well as the lack of opportunities for young people serving as a factor for gang membership.⁴⁸⁴ In addition, speakers discussed and expressed concern regarding the impact of the violence on children, including the difficulties they faced in returning to school, which were progressively re-opening since their closure in 2022.⁴⁸⁵

Meetings: The question concerning Haiti, 2023

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9247 24 January	Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) (S/2023/41)		Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH	13 Council members ^a , all invitees ^b	
S/PV.9311 26 April	Report of the Secretary-General on BINUH (S/2023/274)		Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	13 Council members ^c , all invitees ^d	
S/PV.9368 6 July			Barbados, Dominican Republic,	Special Representative of the Secretary-	13 Council members ^e , all invitees ^f	

⁴⁸³ See [S/PV.9247](#), United Arab Emirates, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Malta, United Kingdom, Switzerland; [S/PV.9311](#), Ecuador, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), China, Switzerland, Albania, Brazil, Malta, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Haiti and Canada (on behalf of Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti); [S/PV.9368](#), Jamaica (on behalf of CARICOM), Ecuador, United Arab Emirates, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), Brazil, Malta, China and Switzerland and Haiti; and [S/PV.9449](#), Ecuador, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Malta, China, and Jamaica (on behalf of CARICOM).

⁴⁸⁴ [S/PV.9247](#), Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9311](#), Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), China and Brazil; [S/PV.9368](#), United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV.9449](#), Malta, Jamaica (on behalf of CARICOM).

⁴⁸⁵ [S/PV.9247](#), United Arab Emirates, Malta, and Canada; [S/PV.9311](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), Malta, and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9368](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), and Malta; and [S/PV.9449](#), Switzerland, Russian Federation, and Jamaica (on behalf of CARICOM).

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
			Haiti, Jamaica	General, civil society representative of <i>Fondasyon Je Klere</i> (FJKL)		
S/PV.9377 14 July		Draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and United States (S/2023/519)	Haiti		Seven Council members ^g , Haiti	Resolution 2692 (2023) 15-0-0
S/PV.9430 2 October	Letter dated 14 August 2023 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/596)	Draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and United States (S/2023/709)	Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya		12 Council members ^h , all invitees ⁱ	Resolution 2699 (2023) 13-0-2 ^j (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9444 19 October		Draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and United States (S/2023/787)	Haiti		Six Council members ^k , Haiti	Resolution 2700 (2023) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9449 23 October	Report of the Secretary-General on BINUH (S/2023/768)		Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Executive Director of UNODC, President of the High Council of Transition	13 Council members ^a , Dominican Republic, Jamaica ^l	
S/PV.9504 and S/PV.9504/Corr.1 12 December					Two Council members (Gabon, United States) ^m	

^a The representative of Mozambique also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

^b The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^c The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique.

^d The Dominican Republic and Haiti were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council.

^e The representative of Gabon spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and once in his national capacity, speaking also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique.

^f The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. Jamaica was represented by its Prime Minister. The representative of Barbados spoke on behalf of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti. The representative of Jamaica spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community.

^g Brazil, China, Ecuador, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The United Kingdom was represented by the Prime Minister's Special Representative for Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

^h Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

ⁱ Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The representative of Jamaica spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community.

^j *For:* Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Russian Federation.

^k Brazil, China, Ecuador, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Switzerland and United States.

^l The Executive Director of UNODC and the President of the High Council of Transition participated in the meeting by videoconference. The representative of Jamaica spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community. Brazil was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^m The representative of Gabon spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#).